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From biotechnology to cyber-risks, most extreme technological risks cannot be
reliably estimated from historical statistics. Therefore, engineers resort to predictive
methods, such as fault/event trees in the framework of probabilistic safety assessment
(PSA), which consists in developing models to identify triggering events, potential
accident scenarios, and estimate their severity and frequency. However, even the best
safety analysis struggles to account for evolving risks resulting from inter-connected
networks and cascade effects. Taking nuclear risks as an example, the predicted
plant-specific distribution of losses is found to be significantly underestimated when
compared with available empirical records. Using a novel database of 99 events with
losses larger than $50’000 constructed by Sovacool, we document a robust power law
distribution with tail exponent µ ≈ 0.7. A simple cascade model suggests that the
classification of the different possible safety regimes is intrinsically unstable in the
presence of cascades. Additional continuous development and validation, making
the best use of the experienced realized incidents, near misses and accidents, is
urgently needed to address the existing known limitations of PSA when aiming at
the estimation of total risks.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Most innovations are adopted on the premise that the upside gains largely make up
for the downside short- and long-term risks, in particular through the adoption of safety
measures aiming at preventing or mitigating potential losses. But innovations are often
disruptive and, by essence, break new ground. This implies that history is a poor guide
for risk assessment due to the novelty of the technology and the corresponding insufficient
statistics. For highly technical enterprises for which full scale experiments are beyond reach
(such as the Internet and smart grid technologies and associated cyber-risks, technological
and population growth and climate change, financial innovation and globalization and the
dangers of systemic banking crises), engineers resort to simulation techniques and scenario-
based analyses.
To be concrete, we restrict our discussion to the nuclear industry, which has been a leader
in the development of state-of-the-art safety analysis, with outstanding efforts aimed at
preventing incidents from becoming major accidents. For this, probabilistic safety assessment
(PSA) has been developed as a decision support tool aiming at ensuring a high level of plant
safety limiting the risks of possible release of radioactivity. PSA consists in developing fault
and event tree models to simulate accidents, their different triggers and induced scenarios,
their severities as well as their estimated frequency [1, 2]. When performed as an on-
going process continuously refined using the information of new examples, plant-specific
safety analysis has proved very useful for the implementation of ever better safety barriers,
keeping the advantages of the technology while reducing its undesirable dangers. PSA is a
well-established discipline with growing applications in support of rational decision-making
involving important technological and societal risks.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of the PSA
methodology. Section 3 describes the main predictions of PSA with respect to the plant
specific “core damage frequencies” and the “large early release frequencies”, before com-
paring them quantitatively with the database of losses per event constructed by Sovacool
[18], with special care to demonstrate the robustness of the reported power law distribution.
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3Section 4 introduces and analyzes a simple conceptual model of cascades of failures that
allows us to rationalize the discrepancy between predicted and realized losses. Section 5
concludes.
II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT (PSA)
PSA provides nuclear plant-specific information on risk metrics at three sequential levels
of end states (levels 1-3). Level 1 corresponds to the assessment of the risk of a core damage
(core damage frequency or CDF). Level 2 assesses the size of radioactive releases from the
reactor building, in the event of an accident (large early release frequency or LERF), in
order to develop accident management strategies and identify potential design weaknesses
in reactor containment buildings. Core damage frequency (level 1) and large early release
frequency (level 2) are regarded as representative surrogates to steer design and operations
of systems towards achieving quantitative and qualitative safety goals. Level 3 evaluates the
impact of such releases on the public and the environment and is used mainly for emergency
planning. In the nuclear domain, PSA Levels 1 and 2 are required to support regulatory
activities in most countries (e.g., in the US since 1995 to complement the deterministic
approach within the framework for risk informed regulation). The PSA methodology has
developed into national and international guidelines (for an history of PSA, see for instance
chapter 2.4 in Ref. [3] and chapter II-b in Ref. [4]). International guidelines are presented
in Refs. [5, 6] and Ref. [7] (for the later, see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/ for
updates and revisions). This has resulted in widely established and used codes, such as
SAPHIRE 8 (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations),
MELCOR (see for instance Ref. [8]) and MACCS2 (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code
System, Version 2).
Since many years, PSA is not thought to represent the true risks and to become general-
ized across sectors, countries and events without considerable adjustments. PSA is mainly
thought of as a platform for technical exchanges on safety matters between regulators and
the industry, among peers, between designers and operators [9]. PSA provides a rigorous
and methodical way to steer towards measures to achieve safety goals by efficient use of
resources and measures. PSA is a fairly well developed mature methodology, although di-
versely implemented and used in different countries, in particular in the choice of internal
4and external events that are included in the analysis.
The basic methodology of PSA is based on logic trees and human reliability analysis
(HRA) incorporating unintentional failures only, with the uncertainty analysis being re-
stricted to data variation that assume traditional (Normal) distributions. Common cause
failure (CCF) analysis is included by point estimates on fractions of the system, with rare
event approximations and cut-sets with cut-off values for the quantification of fault trees
and binning techniques to cope with the large number of sequences. PSA uses in general
the assumption that a nuclear power plant is essentially a closed system, even under catas-
trophic accident conditions. There are considerable weaknesses concerning the neglect of
cascades and the transformation of PSA modeling to consider the nuclear power plan as
an open system with strong interactions with its environment as well as to include the im-
portance of local conditions, in particular under severe accident conditions. PSA is limited
to single units embedded in an ideal environment, in which a safety culture is assumed to
be ensured, and for which atmospheric transport and dispersion dominates (thus neglecting
other pathways). This has implications for the conclusions, when the nature of the triggering
event (earthquakes, flooding / tsunamis) affect large areas, and/or other sources of radiation
(spent fuel pool) exist, which are currently neglected. There is also limited feed of accident
insights back into PSA methodology as well as few new approaches and models developed
in other sectors and fields that influence PSA.
III. CONFRONTING PSA WITH REALITY
A. Understanding the predictions of PSA
Probabilistic safety assessment is seldom used for communication but, in reality, it is
sometimes used to support political decisions, within the public debate and by actors other
than the nuclear industry such as the insurance industry. And this naturally raises the
issue of the possible gaps between the occurrence of accidents, public perceptions and the
predictions of PSA.
In order to frame correctly the discussion on how to use PSA to estimate risk surrogates
such as core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF), we stress
again that the basic methods of PSA levels 1 and 2 use fault/event trees, human reliability
5analysis (HRA) and common cause failure (CCF), to model plant and operator behavior
according to principles of reductionism in a plant specific way limited to single units. In this
way, PSA models failure of safety systems using linear semi-dynamic causal chains, with
binning techniques and many approximations allowing quantification. And severe accident
management guidelines (SAMG) are taken into account in such framework, as long as they
are planned and trained.
PSA level 3 studies are relatively rare, and uses of PSA to estimate risks for the public
are mostly based on levels 1 and 2 studies, which make assumptions about population
behavior, take deterministic (early) and stochastic (late cancer effects) into account for
submersion, inhalation and ingestion exposure pathways. They are site-specific but extend
the calculations of consequences to large distances (800 km) to capture low dose latent
effects. “Old” studies include Refs. [10, 11, 20], which have been criticized for instance by
Marshall [12] and Speed [13]. Revisions of “old” studies include Ref. [14], NUREG-1150
[15] and NEEDS [16], the later uses generic, simplified tree techniques for EPR at sites in
five countries.
Plant specific core damage frequencies (CDFs) for light water reactors obtained by
PSA vary between 10−4/reactor-year and 10−5/reactor-year (chapter 2.5.2 in Ref. [3])
and go down to 10−6/reactor-year for newly built plants (EPR in Finland have CDF of
2 · 10−6/reactor-year) or well back-fitted plant (such as the KKL plant in Switzerland).
These values are accepted by licensing authorities after thorough review. Compared with
these general CDFs values of 10−4 − 10−5/reactor-year, plant specific LERFs demonstrat-
ing containment capabilities are typically one order of magnitude lower, in the range
10−5 − 10−6/reactor-year.
Concerning fatalities, the above cited studies show maximum consequences of about 105
latent fatalities at a probability of 10−8 per reactor-year or even lower frequency level and
steep decrease as improvements are implemented (see e.g. chapter 2.5.3 of Ref. [3] and Ref.
[4]). These high consequence numbers are due to an assumed linear dose-risk relationship.
B. Comparison between PSA frequencies and empirical data
Over the human history of nuclear power, there has been 3 to 5 core damage events for
a total of about 10’000-15’000 reactor-years, depending on whether the three core damage
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as 1 or 3: (i) the Three Mile Island accident (TMI) in the US on March 28, 1979, (ii) the
Chernobyl nuclear accident in Ukraine (former Soviet Union) on 26 April 1986 and (iii) the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear disaster following the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami on 11
March 2011.
Using the most conservative figure of 10−4/reactor-year for CDFs for light water reactor,
one would thus expect typically only 1 such event over the 10’000-15’000 reactor-years of the
human nuclear plant history. More striking, using the most conservative figure for LERF
of 10−5/reactor-year, one would expect 0.1 such event over the course of human history
and not the 2-4 large releases of radioactive elements in the environment (here, the Three
Mile Island accident is not counted as the release of radioactive gases and radioactive iodine
was small). These discrepancies are worrisome but they deal with small numbers for which
statistics is by definition unreliable and therefore broad conclusions are unreliable.
To advance the discussion, we propose to enrich the statistics by using complementary
metrics, here the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) (also known as
survival distribution) of the losses S per event (accidents and incidents). Here, one must
be clear about the terminology. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) classifies
“incidents” are unforeseen events and technical failures during normal plant operation with
no offsite release of radioactive elements or severe damage of equipment. In contrast, “ac-
cidents” usually refer to offsite release of radiation and/or damage to plant equipment. In
the seven-level system of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale, levels 1-3
are “incidents” and level 4-7 are “accidents.” The TMI accident was rated level 5 while
both Chernobyl and Fukushima Dai-ichi accidents are level 7 and these events are the only
reported accidents of nuclear plants over the human history of civil use of nuclear power.
Because these accidents concern only the extreme tail of the distribution, a statistically
sound picture can only emerge by extending the analysis to the body of the distribution. The
goal is to populate the distribution in the region of large and medium size events, to com-
plement the paucity of statistics on the extreme tail of the distribution, the one associated
with the three major accidents mentioned above. For this, we use the database constructed
by Sovacool [18], who extends the definition usually taken by the nuclear industry and regu-
lators to include incidents that either resulted in the loss of human life or more than $50,000
in property damage. This database includes 99 nuclear events worldwide from 1952 to 2009
7that occurred in different kinds of nuclear facilities. The database has been constructed by
searching historical archives, newspaper and magazine articles, and press wire reports, lead-
ing to a database of 99 incidents with an estimation of damage they generated, including loss
of production and property damage [18]. These nuclear incidents include hydrogen explosion
that damage reactor interior, fuel rod catching fire and contaminating facility, partial core
meltdown, cooling system malfunctions, steam generator leaks, fire damage of control cables
leading to disabling core cooling systems, electrical error causing fire destroying control lines
and main coolant pumps, mechanical failure during fuel loading causing corrosion of reactor
and release of radioactivity into the plant area, failed tube bundles in steam generators,
damaged thermal shield and core barrel support, damage to recirculation system pipeline,
instrumentation systems malfunction during startup, corroded reactor coolant pumps and
shafts leading to reactor shutdowns, and so on.
Figure 1 shows a one-to-one comparison of the CCDF of damage respectively generated
from PSA simulations and from the database of the 99 nuclear events constructed by Sovacool
[18]. For the PSA simulations, we refer to the so-called Farmer curve of the 1950s, superseded
by the Rasmussen curve of the 1970s [17, 20] for 100 reactors, which is basically confirmed
by others (German Risk Study, figures 8-13 of Ref. [10]) or NUREG [15]. It is appreciated
by specialists in charge with PSA that these curves may well underestimate extreme events.
For our purpose to advance the discussion on an evidence based platform, the PSA curve
predicts a rather thin tail while the empirical distribution of losses is fat-tailed, a power law
Pr(loss ≥ S) = C/Sµ , (1)
with an exponent µ ≈ 0.7. Concretely, this means that, for nuclear power events with
damage costing more than one billion dollars, their frequencies are underestimated by about
two orders of magnitude. Moreover, rather than being associated with just a few extreme
cases, the existence of a single power law to quantify the distribution of losses over wildly
different magnitudes suggests that the problem has intrinsic structural roots.
C. Robustness of Empirical Distribution
To assess how much to trust the empirical power law distribution of losses reported in
figure 1, we assess its robustness over time. Indeed, an obvious concern with respect to
8the analysis presented in Figure 1 is that we are combining events involving different types
of nuclear facilities and of plants, in particular, with different technologies and generations
as well as of varying operational contexts. But nuclear plants and their safety procedures
are continuously updated, resulting in major technological improvements over time [19].
This suggests that the distribution of losses should change to reflect that extreme risks are
becoming less and less probable. Indeed, following the TMI (1979) and Chernobyl (1986)
accidents, it is a fact that safety has improved. The release of the WASH-1400 Report in the
United States has consecrated the adoption of PSA compared with more simplistic safety
methods, followed by widespread adoption by other countries [20].
Figure 2 tests empirically these points. Panel (A) shows the cumulative number of signif-
icant events over time from Ref. [18]. Three regimes can clearly be distinguished. In partic-
ular, following the Chernobyl’s accident, the rate of incidents has been reduced roughly by
70%, most likely as a result of additional safety measures worldwide [19]. Panel (B) of figure
2 shows the three empirical distributions of damage in each of these three periods (first
period ending at the TMI accident, second period until the Chernobyl accident and third
period ending in 2011), together with the distribution over the whole period from 1952 to
2011. It is remarkable that no statistically significant difference can be found, notwithstand-
ing the very different incident rates shown in panel (A) of figure 2. This suggests that, while
safety improvements of nuclear plants and installations had very positive effects preventing
the initiation of events, therefore reducing their occurrence rate, no significant change in the
structure of the tail distribution (i.e. of the relative likelihood of extreme risks compared
with small risks) can be observed. This suggests that improved safety procedures and new
technology have been quite successful in preventing incidents (as well as accidents), but mit-
igation has not significantly improved. This is a paradox, since safety measures should also
be designed to minimize the likelihood that, following initiation, incidents worsen and breach
one or several of the seven defense-in-depth safety barriers that protect the infrastructure
of a typical nuclear plant. Safety barriers include: (i) prevention of deviation from normal
operation, (ii) control of abnormal operation, (iii) control of accidents in design basis, (iv)
internal accident management including confinement protection and (v) off-site emergency
response [22].
As further tests of the reliability and robustness of the power law description, the right
panel of Figure 3 shows the survival distribution functions of loss per nuclear incident, broken
9down in periods of times from 1957 to 2011 with 25 events in each time interval. The tails of
the distributions for the five time periods have the same power law structure, as confirmed
by the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the tail exponent µ for each distribution
shown in the right panel.
IV. CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF CASCADES OF FAILURES
A. Motivations
In order to rationalize this discrepancy between predicted and realized losses, we propose
a simple conceptual model that embodies the observation that most important industrial
accidents involve cascades with inter-dependent and mutually amplifying effects [23]. As
reviewed above, such cascades are usually modeled in probabilistic safety assessment by using
fault and event tree techniques [17]. We suggest that the discrepancy discussed in subsection
IIIB may results from the complexity of the nonlinear cascades that is likely to obfuscate
some critical paths that turns out to dominate the generation extreme events. In other words,
we suggest that simple models may have a role to complement more complex models. For
instance, simple time-dependent statistical models running on desktops may over-perform
large-scale general circulation models requiring super-computers for the prediction of climate
cycles such as the Southern Oscillation Index and El Nin˜o event [24]. The prediction of
material failure has been shown to be feasible and successful with simple models capturing
the essence of the mechanism of positive feedbacks during the damage process [25, 26], an
approach that can be extended to other complex dynamical systems [27]. Similarly, complex
intermittent dynamics can be quite well represented by simple Boolean delay equations
[28]. Moreover, it has recently been shown that combining simple and complex models can
improve predictive accuracy and quantify better predictive uncertainty, with applications to
environmental and climate science [29].
In this spirit, we consider a simple model of cascades of failures, in which an accident
is modeled as a succession of unbroken and broken safety barriers with increasing damage.
Our goal is to use the simple conceptual model to translate the discrepancy shown in Figure
1 into technically meaningful insights.
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B. Definition and main properties
Starting from an initiating event generating a damage S0, we assume that an event may
cascade into a next level with probability β with associated additional damage Λ1 · S0.
When this occurs, the cascade may continue to the next level, again with probability β and
further additional damage Λ2Λ1 ·S0. The probability for the incident to stop after n steps is
P (n) = βn(1− β). After n steps, the total damage is the sum of the damage at each level:
Sn = S0
n∑
k=1
Λ1...Λk . (2)
Thus, Sn is the recurrence solution of the Kesten map [30, 31]:
Sn = ΛnSn−1 + S0 (3)
As soon as amplification occurs (technically, some of the factors Λk are larger than 1), the
distribution of losses is a power law, whose exponent µ is the function of β and of the
distribution of the factors Λk that solves the equation E[Λ
µ
k ] = 1 [30–32].
The multiplicative mature of the damage represented in expression (2) captures a coarse-
grained modeling of the law of “proportional growth” such that future damages are pro-
portional to present damage, for instance via a branching process. Alternatively, one can
view the multiplicative structure as reflecting a sequence of triggering events, the larger the
existing damage, the larger is the future potential future damage that can be triggered by
it. This proportional growth of damage is not thought to represent faithfully the details
of each damage path but rather embodies a coarse-grained average law. In a sense, future
damage events “preferentially attachment”, result from or are triggered via various pathways
by existing damage.
In the case where all factors are equal to Λ, this model predicts three possible regimes
for the distribution of damage: thinner than exponential for Λ < 1, exponential for Λ = 1,
and power law for Λ > 1 with exponent µ = | lnβ|/ lnΛ, as shown in the next subsection.
C. Solution of the cascade model for homogenous factors Λk = Λ
The following is a detailed study of the possible behaviors of the model, in particular the
different regimes around the critical point Λ = 1.
Three regimes must be considered:
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1. For Λ < 1, the distribution is given by
PΛ<1(S ≥ s) = (1− β)
(
1−
s
smax
)c
, smax :=
S0Λ
1− Λ
, c :=
lnβ
lnΛ
> 0 . (4)
This distribution can be approximated in its central part, away from the maximum
possible loss smax, by a Weibull distribution of the form
Pr(S ≥ s) ∼ e−(s/d)
c
. (5)
For Λ → 1−, we have smax → +∞ and, for s ≪ smax, expression (4) simplifies into a
simple exponential function
PΛ→1−(S ≥ s) ∼ e
−| ln(β)|s/S0 . (6)
2. For Λ = 1, the distribution of losses is a simple exponential function since Sn = nS0
is linear in the number n of stages and the probability of reaching stage n is the
exponential P (n) = βn(1 − β). Actually, the expression (6) becomes asymptotical
exact as
PΛ=1(S ≥ s) = (1− β)e
−| ln(β)|s/S0 . (7)
3. For Λ > 1, the distribution of losses is of the form,
PΛ>1(S ≥ s) =
1
(1 + s
s∗
)c
, s∗ :=
S0Λ
Λ− 1
, c :=
|lnβ|
lnΛ
, (8)
which develops to a power law distribution of losses of the form Pr(loss ≥ S) = C/Sµ
with µ = c, when Λ→ +∞.
For Λ→ 1+, the tail is still power law and the exponent µ grows without bound if the
probability β does not converge to 1. If both Λ→ 1+ and β → 1+ such that Λ = 1−a,
β = 1− ρa, with a→ 0+ and ρ constant, we have µ→ ρ.
D. Model calibration
Figure 4 presents these different regimes and the corresponding parameters calibrated to
the PSA curves and to the empirical records. We calibrate the model by using expression
(8) because, for both the Farmer curve and empirical records, the solution lies in the region
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Λ > 1. The calibration consists in finding (i) the probability β and (ii) the damage factor Λ
from the ex-ante predictions obtained from the Farmer safety analysis and from the ex-post
historical records.
Both distributions are calibrated first by grid search. From the fitted parameters, one
hundred distributions are generated and fitted again by grid search. The final parameters of
each distribution are the median values of the bootstrapped distributions. The correspond-
ing fits are shown in figure 5 for the Farmer curve (panel A) and for empirical records (panel
B). We obtain (βFarmer ≈ 0.9; ΛFarmer ≈ 1.05) compared with (βemp. ≈ 0.95; Λemp. ≈ 1.10).
Interpreted within this cascade model, the safety analysis leading to the PSA curve at-
tributes roughly a 90% probability that an incident having reached a given level of severity
may cascade into the next one. To account for the observed distribution of losses, this
number needs to be increased by just 5% to about a 95% probability of cascading. Thus,
an underestimation of just 5% in the probability β for a cascade to continue and in the
additional amplifying factor Λ has the effect of leading to a significant underestimation of
the distribution of losses, in particular for large events. The origin of this sensitivity stems
from the proximity of β to the critical value 1, likely due to optimization as occurs in almost
any human enterprise associated with the design, modeling, planning and operating of many
complex real-world problems [33–35].
V. CONCLUSIONS
Development of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) at level 3, which evaluates the im-
pact of unintended radioactive releases on the public and the environment, has been slowed
down and only a few studies exist including a) modifications to enhance operational perfor-
mance, safety and security enforcing measures, b) improved understanding and modeling of
several accident phenomena and potential event sequences, c) advances in PSA technology
and other, including simulation techniques and use of huge data. For example, the US NRC
has not sponsored development of PSA level 3 since 1990 [4].
In this article, we have presented a structured analysis based on empirical evidence that
suggests a poor track record of PSA to reflect adequately the true risks involved in the nuclear
industry. In particular, PSA is currently not adapted to identify correctly the likelihood of
large catastrophes. The recognition obtained from our study of (i) extreme heavy-tailed
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losses and (ii) the critical nature of cascades during incidents and accidents calls for the
integration of the observations and statistics over a large heterogeneous set of incidents into
the PSA framework, a procedure that is at present not implemented and seems still far from
being considered. If the estimation of total risk is the aim, there is an urgent need to address
limitations (despite the acknowledged achievements) and strive to overcome them. Safety
analysis should be a never ending process constantly building on past experience, including
the evolving full distribution of losses, for the development and the implementation of ever
improved measures based on model update [36].
A word of caution should be added, as we use a non-standard database, put together by
Sovacool [18], which represents a best effort, but cannot be considered as sufficiently reliable
to draw policy recommendations, for instance. However, our method to measure the gap
between safety analysis and the size of events at the coarse grained level is a step towards a
systematic and continuous comparison between safety analysis and the actual size of events
(e.g. in financial loss), at the scale of one facility, or at the scale of a utility (e.g. EDF).
Applying our approach to smaller scale studies would also help overcome the problem of the
heterogeneity of nuclear power production technologies, which cannot be addressed currently
due to the paucity of our data. A utility company which would have gathered data on both
(i) distributions generated by PSA, and (ii) loss records, would be in a position to test and
refine PSA by using our method.
The method proposed here applies beyond the nuclear industry to many other human
innovations and technological developments for which history is a poor guide due to the
novelty of the technology and the corresponding lack of history leading to insufficient statis-
tics, in particular for extreme events. Among such difficult unsolved questions, one can
cite the impact of cell phones on brain cancer, genetically modified foods and health risks,
antibiotic use in cattle and resistant bacterias, biotechnological medicine and health risks,
nanotechnology and health risks, Internet and grid technology versus cyber-risks, unequal
distribution of gains from capital markets and the (in-)stability of societies, virtual technol-
ogy and brain development in children and teenagers, human population and technological
development and climate change, financial globalization and systemic banking meltdown,
nuclear energy and chemical industry versus the risks of release of long-lived toxic elements
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in the biosphere, and so on.
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Empirical Records
Farmer Curve
FIG. 1: (color online) Distribution of losses S normalized for 1 nuclear plant × year, obtained
(i) from probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) and (ii) from empirical records [18]. We refer to
the PSA distribution as the “Farmer curve” for historical reason, even if we use the more recent
Rasmussen curve of the 1970s [17, 20] for 100 reactors, which is basically confirmed by others
(German Risk Study, figures 8-13, 14) or NUREG [15]. Safety analysis largely underestimates
the losses due to nuclear incidents. The difference is striking in the tail of the distribution: the
distribution obtained from the PSA method vanishes fast beyond $1 billion damage while empirical
records exhibit a power law tail with exponent µ = 0.7± 0.1 with no apparent cut-off.
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FIG. 2: (color online) (A) Cumulative number of civil nuclear incidents over time since 1957.
Three regimes can be distinguished: (i) the burgeoning nuclear industry with small but quickly
increasing installed capacity with an average rate of 0.55 incidents per year; (ii) from the time of
the Three Mile Island accident to the Chernobyl accident, a rate of 3.6 incidents per year; (iii)
the post-Chernobyl era is characterized by a rate of slightly above 2 incidents per year. (B) Test
for stability of the empirical complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) over three
distinct time intervals of nuclear power industry history and over the whole period, using adaptive
kernel density estimators [21].
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FIG. 3: (color online) Left panel shows the survival distribution functions of loss per nuclear
incident, broken down in periods of times from 1957 to 2011 with 25 events in each time interval.
The tails of the distributions for the five time periods have the same power law structure, as
confirmed by the maximum likelihood estimates (MLE) of the tail exponent µ for each distribution
shown in the right panel. The MLE are calculated for each of the five distributions by varying
the lower threshold in units of million US$ (abscissa), i.e. by taking into account only the losses
larger than the threshold value given by the abscissa in the right panel. This allows us probing the
stability of the power law tail. One can observe the exponents clustering around the value µ = 0.7
for thresholds larger than $30 million. The two continuous lines indicate the 95% confidence interval
for the MLE of the exponent µ.
20
Semi-Extreme
 Risks 
Extreme Risks 
Bounded
 Risks 
e
xp
o
n
e
n
tia
l d
is
tri
bu
tio
n
 
o
f d
a
m
a
ge
Empirical Records
Safety Analysis
FIG. 4: (color online) Phase diagram showing the three regions of fat-tail risks predicted by the
cascade model: (i) bounded risks with mean and variance defined (exponent 2 < µ), (ii) semi-
extreme risks with only mean defined and variance undefined (exponent 1 < µ ≤ 2) and (iii)
extreme risks with unbounded mean and variance (exponent µ ≤ 1). Empirical records clearly
identify nuclear accidents as extreme risks (upper right red point with confidence intervals), whereas
safety analysis predicts that damage following nuclear incidents is fat-tailed yet bounded (lower
left).
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FIG. 5: Calibration of the accident propagation cascade model with expression (8). For the safety
analysis (Farmer curve in panel (A)), we find that the probability of propagation is β = 0.9 (lower
bound β05 = 0.9, upper bound β95 = 0.91 at 95% confidence intervals), and the damage factor
is Λ = 1.05 (lower bound Λ05 = 1.04, upper bound Λ95 = 1.06, at 95% confidence interval) for
Smin = 10
7. Panel (B) shows the best fit of expression (8) to the real data is found for β = 0.95
(lower bound Λ05 = 0.94, upper bound Λ95 = 0.96 and Λ = 1.10 (lower bound Λ05 = 1.08, upper
bound Λ95 = 1.15).
